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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE UK CONTEXT 
This piece explores the way that administrative law and judicial review cases, including 
claims for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) ('the ECHR'), 
whether resolved before a hearing or otherwise, have shaped the way that the UK 
government has been held to account during the coronavirus pandemic. As Tom Hickman 
QC has explained, the UK government, unlike some other European executives and 
administrations, did not seek to derogate from the any fundamental rights under the ECHR 
using Article 15 ECHR procedures, even if, as the European Court of Human Rights has 
held in Lawless v Ireland (No.3) (1961), that derogation is possible in a situation 
comprising a "crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a 
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threat to the organised life of the community"2. There is a vocal lobby in opposition to the 
'lockdown' measures deployed by the UK government that, despite 126, 000 coronavirus 
deaths at the time of writing, argues that the true 'threat to the organised life of the 
community' is in fact the deployment of 'lockdown' laws themselves. This is not to say that 
there have not been serious concerns about the human rights impacts of a very wide range 
of coronavirus restrictions (some of which are discussed below), and considerable 
constitutional impropriety from the UK government at times. In Lord Sumption's words, the 
"sheer scale on which the government has sought to govern by decree, creating new 
criminal offences, sometimes several times a week on the mere say-so of ministers, is in 
constitutional terms truly breathtaking"3. 
Judicial review claims in the UK throughout the 2020-21 pandemic phase have 
highlighted both the social justice and the civil liberties issues with the government 
response to the impact and seriousness of COVID-194. These legal claims have been based 
around Human Rights Act grounds, and sometimes on wider international human rights law 
instruments, and also on traditional common law grounds of review; such as irrationality, 
failure to consult, and other types of illegality ground. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown 
us the multitude of ways in which drastic public health policy can undermine human rights 
even as it brings legislative measures that are taken to protect us from a virulent disease, 
given the all-too-often fatal consequences for those who are infected. As shown in the 
important Court of Appeal judgment in the 'lockdown' case of Dolan, discussed below, 
                                                 
2 See Tom Hickman QC, 'The coronavirus pandemic and derogation from the European 
Convention on Human Rights', E.H.R.L.R. 2020, 6, 593-609; quoting the judgment of the 
Strasbourg Court in Lawless v Ireland (No.3) (1961) 1 E.H.R.R. 15 at 28. 
3 Jonathan Sumption, Law in a Time of Crisis, Profile Books, 2021, 228. 
4 On procedural impacts of the pandemic, see Joe Tomlinson, Jo Hynes, Emma Marshall, 
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rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), and taking effect in the 
UK through the Human Rights Act 1998, work on the basis of a variety of structures and 
degrees of importance and protection, depending on the rights concerned. The range of 
ECHR rights interfered with, through the coronavirus pandemic, has been very great 
indeed. And yet there have been constitutionally drastic inroads into the rule of law in the 
UK in the last 12 months, too. As a result, this piece concludes with a short discussion of 
the importance of the values and operation of the rule of law during a time of crisis such as 
in the current pandemic. 
I was motivated to write a first draft of this piece on the 8th December 2020, as 
hopeful news broke of the first person in the UK, Margaret Keenan, being vaccinated 
against COVID-19 outside of a trial programme, and using a vaccine developed by 
Pfizer/BioNTech. Very sadly, many more deaths related to the coronavirus pandemic lie 
ahead, globally and in the UK itself. The emergence of more transmissible strains of 
COVID-19 saw rates of deaths and hospitalisations both increase in the winter of 2020-21 
in the UK, necessitating a third, lengthy 'lockdown' by way, once more, of ministerial 
health protection regulations - approved by the UK Parliament on the 6th January 2021. 
Joshua Rozenberg has explained that following the landmark judgment in Miller 
No. 2 on the (non-)prorogation of Parliament in late 20195, an advocate in the case made 
the point to him that "the thing about great cases is that what once seemed impossible now 
seems inevitable"6. It would seem that the thing about pandemics is that what once seemed 
impossible now seems inevitable. Across the UK, secondary legislation has been used to 
impact on the freedoms, liberties, health, education and labour of tens of millions of people, 
largely without Parliamentary scrutiny at the time of restrictions coming into force; albeit 
                                                 
5 R (Miller and others) v Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41 
6 Anonymous, in Joshua Rozenberg, Enemies of the People? How judges shape society, 
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with the overarching goal of preserving the function and integrity of the National Health 
Service (NHS), and with it, preserving life and meeting substantive Article 2 ECHR 
obligations on a mass scale. But as a result, many different ECHR rights have been affected 
on a similarly mass scale and in novel, unexpected ways, due to the impact of COVID-19 
and the measures taken to suppress it in the UK.  
The coronavirus pandemic of 2020-201 has arguably 'engaged' the absolute right 
to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR, for example, when 
families have been prevented from visiting vulnerable loved ones in residential care, thanks 
to a lack of 'personal protective equipment' (PPE), or the lack of accurate, accessible and 
prompt testing of possible cases, or both. At the same time,  and in particular in the spring 
of 2020, twenty thousand estimated coronavirus deaths in adult residential case homes 
occurred in the 'first wave' of the pandemic in the UK, leading to claims of a violation of 
the 'operational' duty on the state to preserve life under Article 2 ECHR7. At the time of 
writing, as of 26th March 2021, at least 126, 000 people, most with underlying health 
conditions, had succumbed to coronavirus-related deaths in the UK alone. Alongside this 
stark reading of the pandemic in the UK, the argument has been made that the fall in access 
to and provision of NHS services concerning, amongst other things, cancer care and 
treatment have raised other Article 2 ECHR issues due to a fall in screening and diagnosis 
during the earlier waves of the pandemic8. 
As phases of the pandemic have progressed, a number of judicial review cases 
have received national media coverage in the UK, as the pandemic has continued into a 
'second wave' in the UK, from September 2020 onwards. For example, the Doctors' 
                                                 
7 See https://www.clydeco.com/en/insights/2020/11/permission-granted-for-judicial-
review-of-covid-19 (accessed 08.12.2020). 
8 See for example, in Miroslav Baros (2020), 'The UK Government’s Covid-19 Response 
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Association UK began a JR claim over the shortage of NHS PPE, focusing on the need for 
a public inquiry, raised by allegedly insufficient protection from viral infections9. In terms 
of human rights grounds and freedom of religion, Catholic worshipper Lauren Monks 
challenged the 'lockdown' Regulations in their different iterations, and at a point before 
their restrictions began to be eased, resulting in some consideration that restrictions on 
religious worship in larger gatherings may have been unlawful10. And perhaps most 
prominently amongst those claims to be granted a full hearing to date in the High Court in 
England and Wales, microbiologist Dr Cathy Gardner has sought JR of alleged decisions, 
and a policy failing, to discharge untested and possibly-COVID-19-infected patients from 
hospitals into adult residential care homes; the site of arguably the most horrible and 
preventable loss of life in the pandemic within the UK11. 
In terms of broader international human rights standards, there have been 
challenges to policy arising from the impact of the pandemic in situations where 
instruments like the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
2006 (UNCRPD) or the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) apply. 
This might be only in an interpretive sense, given the dualist UK constitution, since these 
instruments are non-incorporated international instruments, meaning that findings of 
violations of rights in the context of claims involving ECHR rights can be so 'fortified'12; or 
                                                 
9 See https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/jun/08/uk-ministers-face-legal-challenge-
for-refusal-to-order-ppe-inquiry (accessed 08.12.2020) 
10 See https://catholicherald.co.uk/high-court-judge-rules-that-public-mass-ban-may-have-
been-illegal/ (accessed 08.12.2020) 
11 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/matt-hancock-faces-legal-action-
from-daughter-of-covid-19-care-home-victim (accessed 08.12.2020) 
12 Per Mostyn J, in R (RF) v SSWP [2017] EWHC 3375 (Admin) at 60. Mostyn J was 
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that these instruments might be more broadly justiciable in the sense of accountability over 
breaches of an aligned UK statute, such as with the Care Act 2014 with regard to the 
UNCRPD, for example.  
In one recent action, disabled man Luke Runswick-Cole successfully threatened 
Derbyshire Council with a judicial review claim over their proposed reductions in Care 
Act-related provision in the pandemic, on the basis of a lack of necessity of those plans13. 
This successful pre-action example, in the context of the standards under the UNCPRD, 
was followed by a successful claim in a different case, in the end, for the charity Article 39. 
The charity had started a judicial review claim relating to pandemic-prompted regulations 
which allowed for a reduction in safeguards around the rights of young people, like 
inspections of children's homes, and were granted permission for a hearing14. After an 
initial defeat for the charity in the High Court stage of the case, in a reversal of that 
decision, the Court of Appeal held in R (Article 39) v SSfE [2020] EWCA Civ 1577 that the 
creation of changes to inspections of children's care accommodation was unlawful, since it 
did not take place with sufficient consultation either with the Children's Commissioner or 
with other key interested bodies, and that there had been a duty to consult that still applied 
during the pandemic. In an even more high-profile case, food charity Sustain sent a pre-
action protocol letter over a lack of free school meals over the 2020 summer period for 
                                                                                                                            
conclusions as to the unlawfulness of an interference with Article 8 and Article 14 ECHR 
rights in that case. 
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poorer children15 - and eventually a government U-turn followed after a famous, and very 
effective, intervention from campaigner and footballer Marcus Rashford16. 
 
 2. THE SIGNIFICANT JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 IN DOLAN 
 
The first UK lockdown regulations (the Health Protection (Coronavirus, 
Restrictions) (England) Regulations (SI 2020/350)) were tough in their effects, and 
restricted the enjoyment of many ECHR rights on the part of tens of millions of people in 
England; while other parts of the UK faced similar restrictions, in turn, in the spring of 
2020. There have been a number of permutations of 'lockdown' regulations in England 
alone17, and even more variation when we look across the UK as a whole, but while the 
combined effect of these restrictions by way of secondary legislation may have been lawful, 
in the sense of not being ultra vires their statutory underpinnings (the Public 
Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984), they have certainly been the most significant shift in 
living conditions, as a matter of law, in any peacetime period of government in the UK in 
modern times. This section of this paper highlights the way in which the Court of Appeal 
addresses these sorts of wider, more universal impacts on human rights in the UK, as 
stemming from coronavirus-related restrictions, in R (Dolan and others) v SSHSC [2020] 
EWCA Civ 1605.  
                                                 
15 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-52931665 (accessed 08.12.2020) 
16 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-53079784 (accessed 08.12.2020) 
17 Barrister Adam Wagner had tracked 64 sets of changes to English lockdown rules by the 
12th January 2021, for example. See: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/england-covid-lockdown-rules-have-
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Simon Dolan, a successful businessman, was affected as so many others were, in 
suffering significant interferences with their ECHR rights thanks to the strictures of 'full 
lockdown'18, when, in essence, leaving one's residence could only be done lawfully with 
'reasonable excuse' and gatherings with others from outside of one's household were 
criminalised. The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed all of Dolan's Human Rights Act-
based grounds. Presented here are snippets of the reasoning that the judgment provided in 
Dolan for rejecting this claim, Article by Article, in ECHR terms: 
 In Dolan, with regard Article 5 ECHR, the Court of Appeal found that there had 
been no unlawful interference with the right to liberty in the original coronavirus 
'lockdown' beginning in March 2020, explaining at [93] that: "…it is a 
mischaracterisation to refer to what happened under the regulations as amounting 
in effect to house arrest or even a curfew."19 
 With regard to the effect of the original 'lockdown' on family life, and in terms of 
impacts on Article 8 ECHR rights through an inability to meet loved ones, the 
                                                 
18 A successful claim for a violation of ECHR rights starts with the courts establishing a 
'victim' of interferences with the right or rights concerned. In relation to an application 
lodged with the European Court of Human Rights in April 2020, Le Mailloux v. France 
(application no. 18108/20), the claimant could not show that had been personally affected 
in their healthcare by French measures to deal with coronavirus, so they did not meet the 
requirements or Article 34 ECHR. 
19 In R (Francis) v SSHSC [2020] EWHC 3287 (Admin), the regulations requiring self-
isolation following a positive test for SARS-COV-2 were challenged as to their lawfulness. 
But the High Court found that the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Self-
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Court of Appeal found in Dolan [at 96] that: "There can be no doubt that the 
regulations did constitute an interference with article 8 but it is clear that such 
interference was justified under article 8(2). It was clearly in accordance with law. 
It pursued a legitimate aim: the protection of health. The interference was 
unarguably proportionate."  
 On Article 9 ECHR, and impacts of restrictions on the right to manifest religious 
beliefs through communal worship indoors, the Court of Appeal in Dolan reserved 
judgement, since the Court was aware of a substantive hearing pending (at the 
time of handing down judgment in Dolan on 1st December 2020) in relation to R 
(Hussain) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2020] EWHC 1392 
(Admin).20  
 On Article 11 ECHR, the Court of Appeal found in Dolan [at 103] that: "…the 
regulations cannot be regarded as incompatible with article 11 given the express 
                                                 
20 However, in Hussain, the High Court found that the lockdown restrictions on communal 
worship in mosques and other communal faith meetings were lawful, and proportionate. 
Swift J considered [at 21-22] that: "What steps are to be taken, in what order and over what 
period will be determined by consideration of scientific advice, and consideration of social 
and economic policy. These are complex political assessments which a court should not 
lightly second-guess… In the circumstances of the present case, the issue is not whether it 
is more important, for example, to go to a garden centre than to go to communal prayer; the 
issue is not whether activities that are now permitted and those that are prohibited are moral 
equivalents. Rather, the question is as to the activities that can be permitted consistent with 
effective measures to reduce the spread and transmission of the Covid-19 virus; that so far 
as they interfere with Convention rights, strike a fair balance between that inference and the 
general interest. That will be a delicate assessment. There will be no single right answer. 
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possibility of an exception where there was a reasonable excuse [to avoid a fine, 
when meeting others]. It may well be that in the vast majority of cases there will 
be no reasonable excuse for a breach of regulation 7 as originally enacted. There 
were powerful public interests which lay behind the enactment of regulation 7, 
given the gravity of the pandemic in late March [2020]." 
 On Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, the Court of Appeal found in 
Dolan [at 110] on the impact on businesses that: "…it is impossible to conceive 
that there was a disproportionate interference with the right in A1P1. The margin 
of judgement to be afforded to the executive is particularly wide in this context, 
because this was a “control of use” case and not a deprivation of property case. 
Furthermore, the balance to be struck under this A1P1 [sic] would have to take 
account of the well-known measures of financial support which the Government 
introduced in the exceptional situation created by the pandemic." 
 On Article 2 of the First Protocol, and given that schools and typically remained 
open to the children of key workers during the pandemic in the UK in 2020, and as 
some teaching continued online and remotely, the Court of Appeal found in Dolan 
[at 113-114] that: "…article 2 of the First Protocol, reflecting a theme which runs 
throughout the Convention, envisages a fair balance having to be struck between 
the rights of the individual and the general interests of the community. In the 
exceptional circumstances of the pandemic, there is no arguable ground on which 
a court could interfere with the actions of the Government in this respect."  
 3. DISCRETION AFFORDED TO POLICYMAKERS DURING A 
 PANDEMIC 
 
 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Dolan recognises that 2020 saw wide-scale 
human rights impacts, and interferences with a number of ECHR, but not unlawful 
interferences, to date, given the justification available to the courts on the basis of an 
important public health rationale. So far, UK government responses to unprecedented 
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the chronically unwell, have received benevolent treatment from the judiciary in England 
and Wales. In terms of wider avenues of accountability, it remains to be seen what the 
outcomes of a future public inquiry report might be, of course21. However, the issue 
remains that government ministers have been able to defend themselves against a range of 
judicial review claims based on human rights grounds, essentially by drawing on i) the 
flexibility of a precautionary approach to proportionality in the pursuit of health protection, 
ii) the principle in administrative law of executive discretion, and iii) the 'margin of 
appreciation' doctrine in relation to the ECHR, and as seen from the perspective of the 
European Court of Human Rights. In recognising these factors, and when scrutinising 
government health protection policy in the pandemic from a human rights perspective, the 
UK courts have already begun to accept arguments about COVID-19 impacts based on 
recognition of policymaker discretion. For example, in Dolan the Court of Appeal 
highlighted [at 97] that:  
"In this context [of impacts on qualified ECHR rights in a pandemic] we consider 
that a wide margin of judgement must be afforded to the Government and to 
Parliament. This is on the well-established grounds both of democratic 
accountability and institutional competence. We bear in mind that the Secretary of 
State had access to expert advice which was particularly important in the context 
of a new virus and where scientific knowledge was inevitably developing at a fast 
pace. The fact that others may disagree with some of those expert views is neither 
                                                 
21 On 17th March 2021, a group of families bereaved as a result of COVID-19 issued a pre-
action protocol letter to the UK government, demanding a decision is made to announce a 
public inquiry into pandemic preparedness, the issue of border control and travel 
restrictions (or the lack of them with regard to the ports and airports of the UK), and the 
timing of lockdowns. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/bereaved-
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here nor there. The Government was entitled to proceed on the basis of the advice 
which it was receiving and balance the public health advice with other matters."  
 Furthermore, as a sort of interpretative fix, or a safeguard in the event of future 
lockdown restrictions which are not judged to be so proportionate at some given point, the 
Court of Appeal in Dolan also took pains to highlight the strength of the human rights law 
framework in the UK. This of course includes an obligation on the courts to 'read into' 
legislation a degree of relevant protection for ECHR rights, even when applying primary 
legislation like an Act of Parliament, and certainly when applying and interpreting a 
statutory instrument like the 2020 'lockdown' Regulations. On this requirement of section 3 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA) and the lockdown Regulations, the Court of 
Appeal in Dolan noted [at 106] that: 
"…the HRA is primary legislation, whereas the regulations are subordinate 
legislation. If there were any conflict between them, it is the HRA and not the 
regulations that would have to take priority. It would be possible to resolve any 
potential conflict by the process of interpretation required by section 3 of the HRA 
were there an incompatibility with a Convention right…" 
 So while the observance of a doctrine of recognising policymaker discretion 
presumably has its limits for the UK judiciary, so long as lockdown restrictions continue to 
be made under secondary legislation and in a way that aspires or purports to be 
proportionate, and is reviewed by Parliament on a proper basis, the UK courts will reassure 
themselves that COVID-related restrictions can be 'read down' if necessary to ensure ECHR 
compliance. However, this does not alleviate the everyday experience for tens of millions 
of people in relation to the restrictions involved in the pandemic response, or its 
enforcement. And in relation to the 2020-21 pandemic, the UK government will not be able 
to easily brush off claims that there have been violations of the right to life, and in 
particular the positive obligation to preserve life under Article 2 ECHR; or to protect the 
right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. More evidence about the 
human rights impacts of the pandemic is coming to light, in this regard. For example, there 
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decision-making by clinicians was at times poor with regard to 'do not attempt cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation' (DNACPR) notices being placed on patients records. This report 
found that "increased pressure on staff time and resource due to the pandemic meant that 
conversations about people’s care [and DNACPR notices] were often taking place at a 
much faster pace in busier settings", while the CQC also "heard evidence from people, their 
families and carers that there had been ‘blanket’ DNACPR decisions in place"22. This 
creates a severe risk of violations of the ECHR rights of dying patients and their families, 
as the CQC has explained: 
"Though clinicians can make DNACPR decisions, if these decisions are made in 
ways that do not protect people’s rights to life, it is possible that this may be a 
breach of Article 2. This may happen, for example, by putting a DNACPR 
decision in place without the knowledge of the person and/or those close to them 
and then failing to provide CPR should the person’s heart stop beating. Not 
consulting with the person or their representatives when making a DNACPR 
decision also risks breaching Article 8 of the of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which protects their right to respect for their private and family 
life."23. 
 
 4. HUMAN RIGHTS AND STANDARDS OF 'REASONABLENESS' 
 Article 2 ECHR case law concerning positive obligations to take steps to preserve 
life can turn on what is reasonable, as highlighted below, and what is reasonable can be 
                                                 
22 Care Quality Commission, Protest, respect, connect - decisions about living and dying 
well during COVID-19: Final report, March 2021, 11. 
23 Care Quality Commission, Protest, respect, connect - decisions about living and dying 
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hard to determine when there are few comparators. As Oswald and Grace have recently 
explained in a short comment article for the UK journal Public Law, on the human rights 
obligation to create a functioning COVID-19 tracing app, and contact tracing systems more 
generally, "[t]here is doubt, however, as to whether art.2 obliges particular measures to be 
taken to prevent infection."24 For example, needle sterilisation tablets provided in UK 
prisons were not an unlawful alternative to needle exchange programmes, as determined in 
the European Court of Human Rights case of Shelley v United Kingdom (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 
SE16. Under Article 2 ECHR, the positive obligation on the state to take preventive steps, 
where a real and immediate risk to life exists, is not without practicable limit, and is to be 
measured by the administrative law concept of reasonableness. As Dyson LJ explained in 
R. (on the application of Rabone) v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust [2012] UKSC 2; 
[2012] 2 A.C. 72 at [43], the "standard demanded for the performance of the operational 
duty is one of reasonableness". What is unreasonable will be highly contextual: and in the 
case of SARS-COV-2, the full context will often mean taking into account the age of those 
infected, and who might be far more likely to die, based on 'co-morbidities' such as excess 
weight, diabetes, pre-existing lung/respiratory and heart/vascular diseases, and so forth.  
 So the protection of the most vulnerable in the case of COVID-19 infection is, 
from a perspective of Article 2 ECHR positive obligations, about the reasonableness, or 
unreasonableness, of measures, or inactions, in protecting those most at risk, based on what 
authorities knew or ought to have known, as at particular points in time, and even between 
different phases of the pandemic. It is for these reasons that the most controversial judicial 
review started in 2020 is likely to be a case now set to be heard in the spring of 2021, 
whatever the extent of the UK 'second wave' of COVID-19. This is the application for 
judicial review made by Dr. Cathy Gardner in relation to arguable Article 2 ECHR failings 
in advance of the peak of the 'first wave' of the pandemic as it occurred in the UK, 
                                                 
24 Marion Oswald and Jamie Grace, 'The COVID-19 contact tracing app in England and 
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concerning the discharge of (untested) possibly-COVID-19-infected patients from hospitals 
into care homes, thought to have led to so many untimely and early deaths of older people. 
 
 5. A CONCLUDING THOUGHT ON COVID-19 AND THE RULE 
 OF LAW 
 Most of the restrictions on the full exercise of qualified ECHR rights during the 
UK coronavirus pandemic have been less-than-ideally scrutinised by Parliament and the 
courts. The defence that HM Government will use if further challenged on this, that the use 
of secondary legislation allows for quicker lawmaking when a rapid response of variation 
of the applicable rules is needed to preserve more lives, will seem weak, given the repeated 
delays by government in deciding to act to restore lockdown in the crucial days of late 
December 2020, and the first few days of January 2021. However, it must be said that there 
is a crucial and material difference between the effect on the rights of individuals in 
England and Wales, say, brought about by this use of secondary legislation to create 
COVID-related restrictions for so many people; versus the kind of denial of access to 
justice, and breach of the rule of law, represented by the use of secondary legislation that 
was used to increase employment tribunal fees, and which were quashed in R (UNISON)  v 
Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51. The UK constitution preserves the supremacy of the 
rule of law in a Parliamentary democracy, as a kind of meta-principle which is seen in 
application through the facilitation of access to justice in the outcome in UNISON. The 
most fundamental extension of the meta-principle of the rule of law is the way that the 
courts are empowered to ensure the democratic functioning of the Parliamentary system 
(witness the unanimous stance of the 11-member panel of the Supreme Court in Miller 
No.2 determining in late 2019 that Parliament not been prorogued lawfully or otherwise). In 
UNISON [at 68] the Supreme Court explained that:  
"At the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea that society is governed 
by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society in this 
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Parliament which makes those laws includes Members of Parliament who are 
chosen by the people of this country and are accountable to them."  
 In Dolan, by way of contrast, qualified ECHR rights are applied in a way that tests 
the proportionality of coronavirus-related restrictions; and through the judicial review of 
these restrictions, despite the rejection of claims those restrictions are disproportionate, we 
can see strong jurisprudential evidence that the rule of law is at least intact, even if 
confidence in HM Government is shaken. It remains to be seen what further reputational 
damage the Johnson government can withstand through the period of the pandemic, and 
how that might transfer to its electoral fate. The eventual outcome of the Article 2 ECHR 
claim for judicial review made by Dr. Cathy Gardner in relation to coronavirus deaths in 
care homes in 2020 may be highly influential in this regard. 
 
